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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the
Supreme Court under Article VIII, § 3, of the Utah Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) ; and Rule 45, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, this being a review of the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals by a grant of Plaintiff's Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the

Summary Judgment entered by the District Court in favor of the
State of Utah on the issue of "governmental immunity'1?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the

Summary Judgment entered in favor of the Union Pacific Railroad
in assessing its duties to improve warning devices at railway
crossings?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are believed to be
determinative of the issues presented above:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-15, et seq. (1990);
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (1990);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1990);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990);
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The contents of the cited authority are fully set forth in the
Addendum to this Brief in accord with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceeding and
Disposition in the Lower Court.
These proceedings originated as a wrongful death action
filed by the heirs and/or estates of four individuals who were
killed in an automobile/train collision which occurred in rural
Tooele County, Utah.

Named as Defendants were Tooele County

(subsequently dismissed by stipulation), the State of Utah, Union
Pacific Railroad and its train operator, Paul Kleinman.

(R. 9,

82 and 86).
The Complaint stated four Causes of Action; negligent
operation of the train on the part of Union Pacific and its
employee Kleinman; negligent maintenance and a failure to install
proper warning devices at the railway crossing by the State
(through the Utah Department of Transportation,

!l

UDOT") and

railroad, and; Union Pacific's negligent entrustment of the train
to an unfit operator, Defendant Kleinman.

(R. 1-9).

For

purposes of the present review, the focus is on allegations of
Defendants' failure to maintain adequate safeguards at the
crossing.
In addition to denying specific allegations of the
Complaint, the State and Union Pacific affirmatively alleged
contributory negligence on the part of Patrick Duncan, the
automobile's driver.
sovereign immunity.

The State also defended on the grounds of
Lastly, the Defendants pleaded a

Counterclaim against the Estate of Patrick Duncan for indemnity

2

and contribution as to any recovery awarded other Plaintiffs.
(R. 23-27 and 36-45).
Following a period of discovery, Defendants filed
Motions for Summary Judgment in the Fall of 1987.
and 127-128).

(R. 121-122

Among supporting Affidavits submitted by

Defendants were those of Paul Kleinman, as to operation of the
train; numerous members of UDOT surveillance teams, as to the
decision on whether or not to upgrade warning devices at the
crossing by installation of automatic gates, and; Affidavits by
persons who had examined the crossing and testified to its
general condition and that of the surrounding terrain.

In

response, Plaintiffs offered the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin as
an expert witness who had visited and examined the subject
crossing and opined as to whether it was "extra-hazardous11.

(R.

192) .
Important to the issues presently pending before the
Court, the Affidavits submitted by UDOT ! s surveillance team
members described the process by which crossings received
priority for funding to upgrade warning devices.

This process

can best be described as incorporating information and
projections as to automobile and train traffic, speed, crossing
angle and predicted and actual accident rates into a mathematical
formula (the "Hazard Rating Index") which, if a certain level was
reached, would result in funding.

The Affidavits indicated a

recommendation to install automatic crossing gates at Droubay
Road prior to the Duncan accident but installation was postponed
3

until Federal funding became available.

(R. 357-359 and 403-

405) .
After oral argument on the Motions, and in the face of
UDOT f s recommendation to upgrade warning devices and the
Crommelin Affidavit on the question of the crossing being "extrahazardous", District Judge Timothy R. Hanson entered Summary
Judgment in favor of Defendants on November 17, 1987.
488 and appended hereto).

(R. 477-

The Memorandum Decision found that

Plaintiffs had produced no evidence on negligent operation of the
train and that, as a matter of law, the railroad had no duty as
to placement of warning devices at the crossing.

(R. 484).

The

Court went on to grant the State sovereign immunity, the
determination as to enhancement of warning devices being the
exercise of a "discretionary function".

(R. 482).

Judge Hanson's ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of
Appeals in its Opinion dated April 12, 1990.1

As described

below, Judge Bullock assumed Plaintiffs had stated a prima facie
case of negligence, but proceeded to find that Union Pacific had
no duty to erect warning devices at the crossing (790 P.2d 599)
and UDOT was shielded from liability by governmental immunity
(790 P.2d 602).

Plaintiffs assert that these decisions as to the

relative duties of Defendants with respect to warning devices at
the crossing and the availability of sovereign immunity for the
State are contrary to prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court

Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 790 P.2d 595 (Utah
App. 1990).
4

and Court of Appeals warranting a reversal and remand for
purposes of trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Accident
At approximately 8:50 p.m. on the night of April 9,
1983, a northbound automobile driven by Patrick Duncan and
containing passengers Jeffrey Bowers, his nine month old
daughter, Nicole Bowers and Ramon Henwood was struck by a
westbound Union Pacific freight train in Tooele County, Utah.
All four occupants of Duncan's 1978 Chevrolet Caprice died in the
collision at the intersection of Droubay Road with Union
Pacific's main line trackage.

The 67 car train, operated by

engineer Paul Kleinman sustained relatively minor damage to its
lead locomotive.

(R. 215 and 215). Weather was cloudy with a

light rain falling.

(R. 431) .

Duncan, a California resident was unfamiliar with the
crossing.

He had been visiting relatives in Tooele and, on this

particular occasion, was headed to the home of Steven Bowers
(deceased Jeffrey Bowers' uncle) for a family gathering and
dinner.

(R. 215 and 427-428).
Plaintiffs are the decedents heirs.

To the extent not

set forth above, deceased Patrick Duncan left, as his heirs,
Louis and Noreen Duncan, father and mother respectively; Jason
Duncan, son; and Michael, Tim, Kevin and Brian Duncan, brothers.
Jeffrey Bowers and his daughter, Nicole Bowers, left as their
heirs at law, Michelle Bowers, wife and mother, respectively;
5

Judson Bowers, father and grandfather; Florence Hanson, mother
and grandmother; and Shelly and Sherrie Bowers, sister and aunt.
Deceased Ramon Henwood left as his next of kin, Monica Henwood,
wife; and Phillis and Owen Henwood, mother and father.

(R. at

8) .
THE DROUBAY ROAD CROSSING
Droubay Road is an essentially straight, two-lane road
running north and south through rural Tooele County, Utah
positioned approximately one-half the distance between State
Highway 36 and the western foothills of the Oquirrh Mountains.
The road is an important arterial in the County, serving the
communities of Erda and Bates Canyon.

At this crossing, Union

Pacific!s rails traverse Droubay at an angle of slightly over 43°
north and over 136° south of the track.

(R. at 412).

At the time of the accident, the only warning signs
present from the northbound lane were a railroad advance warning
sign (a circular yellow sign with a large black "X" and a "R" on
either side of the intersecting lanes) located 300 feet from the
crossing and two railroad crossing signs (white cross-bars with
"railroad crossing11 printed in black letters) , 19 feet from the
intersection.2

(R. at 410).

The possible need to upgrade warning devices at the
crossing was raised as early as September of 1979 when Union

Federal standards mandate that in a rural area a railroad
advance warning sign be located 750 feet in advance of a
crossing. (R. at 188).
6

Pacific was approached by Tooele County in connection with a
project to widen Droubay Road.

W.A. Ridge, Union Pacific's

superintendent stated "if the widening of the roadway will
increase the vehicular traffic using the roadway, it would be
well to indicate to the State if any additional crossing
protection is required other than the standard cross-buck at the
present location. ,f
In November of 1981, UDOT re-evaluated the crossing at
Droubay Road pursuant to a second request of the Tooele County
Engineer.

The surveillance team recommended a removal of

automatic crossing signals from Bauer Road, another north-south
arterial in the County which had recently been closed for
installation at the Droubay Road crossing.

(R. at 360 and 361).

The closure had resulted in a projected increase of up to 1,500
(from 100) vehicles on a daily basis, including a minimum of 4
school buses.

High speed automobile and train travel over the

tracks was also noted by the surveillance team.

(R. at 302).

Despite the substantial diversion of high speed traffic to
Droubay Road and over this particular crossing, installation of
mechanical crossing gates was postponed until federal funding
became available.

(R. 403-405 and 357-359).

This was because

the "Hazard Index Rating" arrived at by the surveillance team
allegedly fell just under that required to receive priority for
upgrade funding.
In May and June of 1983, immediately after notification
of the fatal Duncan accident, the UDOT team conducted additional
7

inspections at the urging of Tooele County officials.

(R. 303).

At this time, flashing light signals with gates were proposed.
The recommendation was warranted by "high traffic speed,
including passenger train; high vehicular speed; moderately high
train volume; high predicted accident rate."
(R. 298) .

(emphasis added).

The high incidence of accidents at the Droubay Road

crossing which supported the recommendation to install additional
safeguards is evidenced by accident reports made part of the
record at 212-221.

These reports indicate that, as of May 18,

1983, there had been three similar (for a total of four)
accidents at the intersection.

(R. 188).

Another key factor in compiling the "hazard index"
which ultimately prompted an upgrade was the "angle of crossing
factor" at Droubay Road, 43°.

This angle made it difficult to

gauge the speed and distance of oncoming trains.

(R. 189).

Crommelin's Affidavit testimony on this point is substantiated by
a test to estimate train speeds conducted by Highway Patrol
Trooper Terry Smith and made part of the record at R. 433.
found:
. . . at that angle to the train, it was very
difficult to judge the speed of the train. I
estimated the speed of the train at 45 m.p.h.
and felt sure I had time to cross the
intersection. On radar stationary, the train
was traveling at 70 m.p.h. I would not have
made it through the intersection if I had
tried. The problem of estimating train speed
is exacerbated at night, when the Duncan
accident occurred."
(R. 433).
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Smith

Through use of the mechanical formula developed by the
United States Department of Transportation, UDOT indexed the
subject crossing at .21, well over the .15 index where additional
precautions, such as automatic crossing gates are warranted.

As

a result, mechanical gates with flashers were installed at the
Droubay Road intersection in 1985.

Responsibility for

construction work was shared by Union Pacific and Tooele County.
(R. 303 and 298-299).

In addition, Tooele County widened Droubay

Road running north from the crossing by 10 feet to match the
width on the southern approach.

These remedial measures were too

late to save the lives of Patrick Duncan, Jeffrey Bowers, Nicole
Bowers, his daughter, and Ramon Henwood.
It is submitted that the above facts, most of which are
garnered from a canvas of Defendants' own Affidavits and evidence
support a finding that the Droubay Road crossing was "extrahazardous."

Nonetheless, and despite assuming Plaintiffs had

stated a prima facie case of negligence, the Court of Appeals
found no liability on the part of either the State or Union
Pacific for dangerous conditions at the crossing.

From this

anomalous result springs the present review.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
AT POINT I
As a matter of law, the District Court and Court of
Appeals relieved the railroad from any responsibility as to
dangerous conditions created by inadequate warnings at railroad
crossings.

This was premised upon Utah statutes which vest
9

authority over highway signage with the Utah Department of
Transportation.
These rulings were erroneous.

There is absolutely no

indication that the legislature by enacting the statutory scheme
(codified at Utah Code Ann. 54-4-15 et seq.) intended to abrogate
the common law duties imposed upon railroads to make and maintain
safe crossings.

Nor is there any evidence that the legislature

intended to repeal the statutory liability of railroads for
damages assessed by other code provisions, specifically, § 56-111.

Finally, the lower court decisions are flawed as contrary to

sound public policy considerations.
AT POINT II
Although the District Court conceded the State might be
liable, under some circumstances, for injuries occurring at
"extra-hazardous" crossings, the Court of Appeals foreclosed such
liability, concluding "that UDOT is immune for its failure to do
more than minimal warning and control . . . "

Duncan v. Union

Pacific Railroad, 790 P.2d 598 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals finding of governmental immunity
is unsound.

It is contradicted by recent precedent from the Utah

Supreme Court and other sections of the Governmental Immunity
Act.

It is also poor reasoning to permit a governmental entity

to get by with only "minimal" precautions at a dangerous railroad
crossing when it is statutorily mandated to "promote the public
safety".

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1990).
AT POINT III
10

Should this Court reject immunity for the State and
hold the railroad liable for injuries at dangerous crossings, it
must then find there are disputed issues of material fact as to
whether or not the Droubay Road intersection is "extra-hazardous"
requiring Defendants to take additional precautions.

Disputed

facts raised by the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin and Defendants'
own Affidavits and evidence were more than sufficient to defeat
the Rule 56 Motions for Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Undisputed evidence in our case reveals Union Pacific
and the State had knowledge of a dangerous condition at the
Droubay Road rail crossing.

Tooele County officials had

requested numerous inspections of the crossing with an eye toward
enhancing inadequate warning devices.

Although UDOT could have

ordered the railroad to cover installation costs, placement of
automatic crossing gates was deferred until federal funding was
available.

This delay was in spite of the recommendations from

Union Pacific representatives and members of the surveillance
teams.
Yet, as a result of the Court of Appeals opinion in
Duncan, the families of four people who died in a train collision
at the crossing have been unjustly denied compensation.

The

opinion obligates Union Pacific to simply clear vegetation from
areas around its tracks and the State must only provide minimally
effective warning signs on the public road.

11

Thus, free from fear

of being joined in suits for inadequate warning devices, the
State and railroad can sit by and do nothing while on notice of
dangerous conditions imperiling the public.

The Supreme Court

must redefine the duties of the respective Defendants with regard
to improving railroad crossing safety and grant these injured
Plaintiffs the remedy they so aptly deserve.

12

POINT I
THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED THE RAILROAD'S DUTIES TO
MAINTAIN SAFE RAILROAD CROSSINGS.
Without any support from prior precedent, whether from
Utah or other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals in Duncan made
all railroads within the State free from any concerns of
negligence for unsafe conditions at crossings regardless of
notice and requests to cure.

Though this ruling is no doubt

widely heralded by railroads, it is contrary to reason, longstanding statutory and case law precedent and violative of good
public policy.

The Supreme Court is compelled to reverse the

Court of Appeals in this instance and restore the law to former
sound principles.
A.

DESPITE UDOT f S AUTHORITY, UNION PACIFIC CONTINUES TO BE
LIABLE FOR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS AT RAILWAY CROSSINGS.
In a long line of cases commencing with English v.

Southern Pacific Company, 45 P.2d 47 (Utah 1896) this Court
embraced the common law duty imposed upon a railroad to adopt
such reasonable measures for the public safety as common prudence
may dictate in considering dangers at crossings.

See also,

Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 488 P.2d 738 (Utah 1971).
Despite the absence of any Utah Supreme Court opinion absolving
the railroad of this longstanding duty, the Court of Appeals in
Duncan rejected liability on the grounds that Utah Code Ann. §
54-4-15.1 had somehow pre-empted the field.

There is no support

for this proposition in either the cited statute or existing case
law.
13

Although UDOT is given authority to "provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing and improving of
automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at
grade crossings" pursuant to the foregoing statute, there is no
indication that the legislature intended for that authority to be
"exclusive" and in derogation of the railroad's traditional
obligations.

In fact, when Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15 was amended

in 1975, the term "exclusive" was deleted when empowering UDOT to
determine what safety precautions were required at crossings,
while subsection (4) was added to retain the Public Service
Commission's "exclusive" jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising
from UDOT's actions in determining appropriate safeguards.
Other provisions of the Public Utilities Act maintain
the notion that the railroad has continuing duties to improve
railroad crossings.

The Act still obligates Union Pacific to

share costs of warning precautions at crossings.
§ 54-4-15.3 (1990).

Utah Code Ann.

See also, Duncan, 790 P.2d 597, n. 11.

Furthermore, § 54-4-16 requires the railroad to investigate and
file a report on any accident which occurs at a crossing.
The result reached by the Court of Appeals in this case
is also contradicted by statutory duties and liabilities imposed
upon Union Pacific under Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (1990) which
states:
Every railroad company shall be liable for
damages caused by its neglect to make and
maintain good and sufficient crossings at
points where any line traveled crosses its
road.
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There was neither an explicit or implicit repeal of this
provision (in effect since 1898) when the legislature enacted the
Public Utilities Act under which Union Pacific seeks protection.
Though Plaintiffs relied upon this Code provision, the Appeals
Court didn't address the issues raised by 56-1-11 nor did it
attempt to harmonize the potentially inconsistent statutes.

See,

VanWaaoner v. Union Pacific, 186 P.2d 293 (Utah 1947)
(Identically worded predecessor to § 56-1-11 imposed civil
liability on railroad for injuries which occur from negligent
breach of duty to maintain safe crossing).
In view of the express language of § 54-4-15.1, other
statutory authority and the clear and unequivocal holdings of
numerous Supreme Court opinions, the Court of Appeals and
District Court committed error in finding that Union Pacific had
no legal responsibility for adequate warning devices at railroad
crossings.
It seems curious that, if the legislature
really intended the crucial and sweeping
changes the railroad suggests, it would do so
in the manner and at the place suggested. The
rules governing negligence claims arising from
railroad crossing accidents were long and
painstaking in development. The cases, and the
rules derived from them date from early
statehood. The change perceived by the
railroad would shift responsibility, and
presumably tort liability, from railroads to
the public. . . [W]e are persuaded that the
statute does not serve the railroad as a
defense to plaintiff's assertion in this suit.
Sullivan v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co., 326 N.W.2d
320, 323 (Iowa 1982) (a railroad cannot hide behind authority of
15

Department of Transportation to determine the use of warning
devices and signs at hazardous crossings in derogation of common
law duties).
B.

EVEN IF UDOT HAD SOLE AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE WARNING
DEVICES, UNION PACIFIC IS STILL NOT FREE FROM LIABILITY.
Although this is a case of first impression before the

Utah Supreme Court, appellate courts from numerous other
jurisdictions have found a railroad has ongoing civil liability
for injuries sustained in crossing accidents attributable to
inadequate warning devices regardless of state authority and
regulation over grade crossings.
It is undisputed that most, if not all, states have
enacted pervasive statutory schemes granting their respective
transportation departments authority to determine the appropriate
method to safeguard the public at railroad crossings as Utah did
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1, et seq.

They serve the salutary

purposes of uniformity within the state's transportation system
and avoids duplication by placing all of the responsibility
within one governmental agency.
It is the desire and intent of the Division of
Safety to meet its legal obligations under
"Utah's Transportation Act" in protecting the
safety of all those who travel in or through
the state, while ensuring reasonable and fair
implementation of safety regulations that will
economically protect the industries and the
public.
LeGRAND 0. JONES, REGULATORY TRANSPORTATION SAFETY, a White
Paper, for the Utah Department of Transportation.

These

objectives are also consistent with policies fostered under the
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Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act, codified at 45 U.S.C.
§ 421, et seq.

Yet, in spite of state authority over railroad

crossings, state and federal appellate courts have uniformly,
until Duncan, refused to discharge railroads from their
traditional duties.
Illustrative is the case of Stevens v. Norfolk &
Western Railway Co., 357 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App. 1976).

There, the

applicable statute provided:
Automatic Train Activated Warning Signals. . .
The authority of the [Public Service
Commission] to require the installation of such
signals shall be exclusive and shall supercede
such power of any other state or local
governmental agency.
IC 1971, 8-6-7.7-2 (Burns Supp. 1976).

Nonetheless, the court

found:
[T]hat a railroad can be found negligent not
only in the manner in which it operates its
trains, but also, once it is determined under
all the circumstances that a grade crossing is
extra-hazardous, it can then be found negligent
in its failure to adequately protect the public
from danger by providing warnings and taking
safety precautions in addition to those
required by statute, and despite the absence of
a public service commission determination that
the crossing is extra-hazardous.
Id. at 4.
Similarly, in Harrison v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad
Co., 413 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. App. 1987) the statute permitted only
authorized officials of the State Road Commission could place
highway traffic signs, including railroad warning signs at any
given crossing.

M.C.L. § 257.615; M.S.A. § 9.2315.
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In other words, defendants cannot erect
additional crossing signs without proper
permission. . . however, apart from the above
provisions, defendants still have the common
law duty of due care. [citation omitted] That
duty includes petitioning the proper
authorities when the railroad or the county
considers warning devices at a dangerous
crossing to be insufficient, so that the
situation can be remedied.
Id. at 431.

Among other states where a railroad has been found

negligent for inadequate warning devices at a crossing
irrespective of state regulation are Illinois, Stromquist v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983);
Iowa, Karl v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.. 880 F.2d 68 (8th
Cir. 1989); Florida, Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. v. Louallen,
479 S.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1985), and; Montana, Runkle v. Burlington
Northern, 613 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982) (also rejecting a pre-emption
of the railroad's duties premised upon the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1973) .
Requiring a railroad to seek governmental approval to
erect appropriate warning devices at a crossing is reasonable in
view of the scant public resources available to correct dangerous
conditions.

As our facts illustrate, installation of upgrades

must often wait two or three years before state or federal funds
become available.

During the waiting period a hazardous

condition persists and grave or fatal accidents can result.
Hence, when a railroad is on notice of a hazardous crossing, it
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must take action and not merely depend on governmental
intervention.3
The precise argument posed by Plaintiffs here was
adopted by the federal district court in McMinn v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 716 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

There, similar to

the above, the state statute prevented the railroad from
effecting a change in warning devices at the crossing without
approval of state authorities.

Still the court found the

railroad was under a duty to petition the appropriate agency to
change conditions and if an upgrade was refused, that refusal
must be challenged in an appropriate manner, including resolution
through litigation or discontinuing service along the line.
In this case it is especially inappropriate for
the railroad to seek to absolve itself of
liability on this ground because it was hardly
vigorous in its effort to persuade the
appropriate regulatory authorities that changes
should be made at the crossing.
Id. at 127.
In totally discharging Union Pacific from liability for
accidents which occur as a result of inadequate warnings at
crossings, the Court of Appeals in Duncan not only ruled contrary
to clear statutory and case law authority within the State of

Union Pacific1s and the State's heavy reliance on this
purported lack of federal funding should carry little weight with
the court. Utah Code Ann. 54-4-15.3 directs UDOT to apportion
the cost of installation or improvement of signals between the
railroad, public agencies and even the county. Here, Union
Pacific did, in fact, pay for the crossing improvements by
performing construction work. (R. 298-299) .
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Utah but also that of other jurisdictions construing similar
statutory schemes for crossing regulation.
C.

RELIEVING THE RAILROAD FROM LIABILITY FOR CROSSING SAFETY IS
CONTRARY TO SOUND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.
1.

Defendant Union Pacific must sometimes Act to Cure
Dangerous Conditions without regard to purely Monetary
Considerations.
One of the principles expressed in the above cases is

the court's refusal to permit a railroad to sit idly by and await
governmental action when it is on notice of dangerous conditions
at a railroad crossing.

With all due respect, government action

is frequently slow or even non-existent.

In light of its duties

to protect the traveling public, railroads must sometimes prod
the government into action or face liability for the tragic
consequences which result from dangerous conditions.

This was

precisely the ruling of the 8th Circuit in the case of Brown v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 703 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1983).
In Brown, local government officials had on two
occasions requested the railroad to install or upgrade safety
devices at the Laurel Street railroad crossing.
were refused.

These requests

Finally, in 1976, an Arkansas Highway Department

surveillance team recommended that warning bells and flashing
lights be installed by applying a "hazardous rating index11.
However, because state and federal funds were unavailable and the
railroad would not, at its expense, install safety devices, the
crossing went unprotected until, in 1979, the subject fatal
accident occurred.
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On the basis of those almost identical facts, the 8th
Circuit upheld the trial court's award of punitive damages
against the railroad.
Punitive damages may be imposed upon a
defendant who knew or had reason to know that
its course of conduct was about to inflict
injury but who nonetheless continued on this
course with a conscious indifference to the
consequences.
Brown, 703 F.2d 1052.

The Circuit Court refused to condone

Missouri Pacific's policy determination "that it is cheaper to be
sued than to protect railroad crossings."

Id., 1053.

Finally,

although the Court considered the presence of federal and state
funding of crossing improvement relevant in determining the
railroad's liability, it found that this did not excuse Missouri
Pacific's duties.
As the Brown opinion states, a railroad's determination
not to upgrade warning devices, and in turn this Court's decision
on imposing liability therefor, cannot be guided entirely by the
funding considerations relied on by Union Pacific and the Court
of Appeals.

Rather, this Court should impose liability on Union

Pacific when a failure to maintain adequate warning devices
results in injury to the public.

When, as here, the railroad is

on notice of dangerous conditions, action must be taken
regardless of federal or state funding issues.
2.

The Court of Appeals has Adopted an Unworkable Standard
as to the Respective Responsibilities of the Parties to
Cure Dangerous Crossing Conditions.
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In assessing Union Pacific's duties with respect to
crossing warning devices, this Court must avoid the confusing
territorial notions espoused by the Court of Appeals in Duncan
and Gleave and promote the primary policy concern of public
protection.
In Gleave,4 the first appellate decision construing the
railroad's responsibilities since enactment of § 54-4-15.1, the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the common law principles originally
stated in English, to wit:
[The railroad] cannot ignore the public peril
at a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing
and excuse itself until UDOT takes action to
upgrade the safety devices at the . . .
crossing. Rio Grande remains subject to a
standard of reasonable care which, under the
circumstances at this crossing, could require
actions to reduce the risks imposed on the
public.
Gleave, 749 P.2d 664.

Yet, in Duncan the Court of Appeals

appears to retreat from the foregoing principles by simply
requiring the railroad to reduce vegetation which might obstruct
a motorist's view.5

In so doing, Judge Bullock defines the

railroad's duties in terms of territorial limits, an unworkable
standard.

Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company,
749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988).
5

Although Gleave was cited for this proposition, its facts
suggest broader responsibilities of the railroad. One of the
facts there relied on by Plaintiffs was D&RGW's failure to
supplement a stop sign it placed at the crossing.
22

Simply put, the railroad must purge its right-of-way of
hazardous conditions while UDOT is responsible for public roads
including signage thereon.

What is absent is the traditional

interaction between State authorities and the railroad to correct
crossing deficiencies.

The State can await Federal funds and the

railroad, while on notice of the dangers, shrug its shoulders and
place blame on an immune governmental authority.

In the

meantime, the traveling public is exposed to the hazard.

This is

an unfortunate result which cannot be condoned by this Court.
Through this review, the Supreme Court is respectfully urged to
return to the laudable policy concerns addressed in English and
other Utah precedent which hold railroads, such as Union Pacific,
liable for maintenance at crossings, including installation of
adequate warning devices.
POINT II
THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY INADEQUATE WARNINGS AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS.
Relying largely on this Courtfs decision in Velasquez
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970), the
Court of Appeals in Gleave and Duncan found UDOT f s decision not
to upgrade warning devices at railroad crossings immune from
liability as the exercise of a "discretionary function" under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a) (1990).

Although the Court of

Appeals was bound by Velasquez, the Supreme Court has the
opportunity to re-evaluate and overrule that authority in view of
twenty years of subsequent sovereign immunity decisions.
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A.

RECENT CASES EXPRESS THE POLICY OF EXPANDING THE STATEfS
LIABILITY.
A constant theme of this Court's recent interpretations

of the Governmental Immunity Act is an expansion of liability on
the part of the Stare of Utah.
The policy and legislative intent behind the
act is to . . . allow more innocent victims
injured by tortious conduct on the part of the
public entities access to the courts for
redress. Fewer such people will be mercilessly
and senselessly barred from recovery for their
injuries sustained at the hands of the entities
designed to serve them.
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah
1980).

This rule should apply with particular force where the

State has expressly assumed duties formerly those of a private
entity (the Union Pacific Railroad) as occurred by the
legislature's enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 (1990).

On

our facts, the State has blurred the distinction between
governmental functions and those traditionally performed by the
private sector.

See, Standiford, 604 P.2d at 1232 and 1233.

In

assuming these responsibilities, the State must assume associated
liabilities as well.
As discussed above, the Court of Appeals decision in
Duncan effectively precludes an injured party from recovering for
any injuries incurred as a result of inadequate warning devices
at railroad crossings.

In so doing, it ignored the "important

substantive right11 of a plaintiff to be compensated for his
losses.

"It is thus essential that the defendant be made to pay

damages and they be equal to plainitfffs loss."
24

Condemarin v.

University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) quoting, R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, § 6.12 at 143 (1972).
The expansive freedom from suit granted the State of
Utah under Duncan is also contrary to another tort principle
espoused in Condemarin, that of deterrence.

Although

traditionally the courts have been slow to recognize the
importance of deterring negligent conduct on the part of the
government, it is now widely accepted that even the sovereign
must be admonished against committing further negligent acts by
holding the State liable for dangerous conditions it helps
create.

This weighs heavily in favor of liability and against

allowing the State a governmental immunity defense in our case.
B.

THE STATE OF UTAH HAS EXPRESSLY WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR
ACCIDENTS WHICH OCCUR AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS.
In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court held that

decisions made by the State as to railroad crossing warning
devices were the exercise of a "discretionary function'1 immune
from suit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a).

By so

holding, Justice Ellett implicitly ruled that discretionary
function immunity took priority over the express immunity waiver
set forth in 63-30-8 under which the plaintiff sought recovery.
That section of the Immunity Act (which seems directly applicable
to hazardous rail crossings) states, in pertinent part:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe or dangerous condition of any highway, .
. . or other structure located thereon.
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As this ruling is contrary to subsequent opinions of the Court,
it is submitted that Velasquez has been overruled, sub silentio,
as the foundation for the sovereign immunity decision in the
present case.

As a result, a reversal of the District and

Appeals Court decisions in Duncan is warranted and a remand for
trial on the State's negligence justified.
In Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) and
Biqelow v. Ingersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court
found that the express immunity waiver of § 63-30-8 was not
modified by discretionary function immunity pursuant to § 63-3010(1)(a).

This is consistent with general rules of statutory

construction which state that in the event of an inconsistency,
specific provisions govern over more general terms.6
undercuts the rationale behind Velasquez.

It also

Hence, regardless of

whether the State is exercising a "discretionary function," when
its decision pertains to highway improvement, immunity is
expressly abrogated.
The Duncan opinion has only added to the confusion
which results from an attempt to interpret all of these immunity
cases on highway and railroad crossing issues.

This Court should

use this opportunity to clarify the law on this question and find
the State of Utah liable on our facts.

The principle that express waivers of immunity as set
forth in § 63-30-8, for instance, govern over immunity grants,
such as "discretionary function" immunity under 63-30-10 (1) (a),
was recently reiterated in Hanson v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah
Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah June 15, 1990).
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C.

EVEN IF DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY STILL APPLIES, THE
DECISION TO IMPROVE WARNING DEVICES IS "OPERATIONAL", NOT
"POLICY-MAKING."
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that immunity under

63-30-10 (1) (a) is not modified by the express waiver in 63-30-8,
the decision to upgrade warning devices at the Droubay Road
crossing is still not an act or omission on the part of the State
immune from suit as it is not the exercise of a "discretionary
function."

Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667

P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).
As discussed above, it is difficult if not impossible,
to reconcile Velasquez with the more recent immunity decisions in
Bigelow, Bowen7 and Richards.

In Duncan, the Court of Appeals

added to that confusion by stating "the government is not liable
in tort for its failure to better maintain or to enhance the
signage" or "for its failure to do more than minimal warning and
control".

Duncan, 790 P.2d 601 and 602, respectively.

These

bewildering attempts to contrast Bowen and Richards with Gleave
and Velasquez is highlighted by Judge Jackson in his concurring
opinion.

At least part of this confusion results from a flawed

attempt to categorize UDOT ! s decision as to warning devices at
crossings as "policy-making" as distinguished from "operational."
Aside from their rulings on application of 63-30-8,
Richards and Bigelow clearly held that decisions as to the design
of traffic control systems (presumably including warning devices

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
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at railroad crossings) take place at the operational level as
distinguished from the policy-making level and hence do not
constitute the exercise of a "discretionary function.f!
v. Incrersol, 618 P.2d 53.

Bigelow

That the decision to upgrade warning

devices is operational, not policy making, is consistent with the
UDOT prioritization procedures.
On our facts, the UDOT surveillance team will inspect a
given railroad crossing and through application of a purely
mathematical formula, arrive at a "hazard rating index'1.

Those

crossings which fall at a certain level receive priority and
funding and those which fall below that level must await later
funding or some other change in conditions.

Here, UDOT

recommended installation of automatic crossing gates at Droubay
Road in 1981, prior to the Duncan accident, but the request for
funding from the federal government was deferred.

This deferral

was "implementive" under the standards in Biqelow and
consequently not immune.
UDOT f s decision not to install automatic crossing gates
at Droubay Road prior to the Duncan accident is not a
discretionary act under the criteria set forth in Little, 667
P.2d 49.

The court there held that to be purely discretionary,

an act by the state must be affirmed under four preliminary
questions:
(1)

Does a challenged act, omission or decision
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy,
program or objective?
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(2)

Is the questioned act, omission or decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of
the policy program or objective as opposed to one
which would not change the course or direction of
the policy, program or objective?

(3)

Does the act, omission or decision require the
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and
expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved?

(4)

Does the governmental agency involved possess the
requisite, constitutional, statutory or lawful
authority and duty to make the challenged act,
omission, or decision?

Id. at 51.

It is submitted that the determination here at issue

fails at least two of these standards.
First, the alleged negligent conduct in this case - the
manner of warning the public - was not "essential to the
realization or accomplishment of a governmental policy.11
v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989).

Irvine

Secondly, the

recommendation to upgrade warning devices was in the nature of a
professional judgment, not policy making.

Abbett v. County of

St. Louis, 424 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. App. 1988) (decision on where to
install guardrail pursuant to standard enunciated in highway
manual does not involve policy making protected under
discretionary function immunity).
347 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. App. 1984)
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See also, Ostendorf v. Kenyon,
(Placement of warning signs on

highway not a discretionary act where state had ntoice of
dangerous condition which could be improved by additional or
better signs).
This analysis is consistent with the decision reached
in Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Ala. 1981).

There, the

plaintiff brought a negligent action against the state alleging,
among other claims, a failure to provide adequate warnings at the
subject railroad crossing.

The state argued that the decision on

the type of warning sign to be utilized was the exercise of a
"discretionary function."

The court rejected the statefs

position finding that the decision to sign was "operational" and
hence not immune.

See also, Williams v. State, 438 S.2d 781

(Fla. 1983) (failure to place warning signs at a railroad
crossing which is known to be dangerous is an operational-level
function immunity which is waived).
The continued viability of Velasquez is gravely
questioned by the Court ! s subsequent opinions in Bigelow, Bowen
and Richards all of which reject a discretionary function
immunity for the government's decisions as to the design and
signage at or on public thoroughfares.

Without Velasquez, the

Court of Appeals decision on sovereign immunity in Duncan must
fall and this case returned to the District Court.
POINT III
IF THE COURT FINDS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE RAILROAD
HAD A DUTY WITH RESPECT TO WARNING DEVICES AND THE STATE
IS NOT IMMUNE THIS CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR TRIAL.
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It is conceivable that the court could reject sovereign
immunity for the State and hold Union Pacific liable for
inadequate warnings at crossings yet affirm the summary judgment
by finding that the Droubay Road crossing was not "extrahazardous11 as a matter of undisputed fact.

This is not, however,

a finding which is supported by the facts in our case.
The question of whether there is something in the
nature of the railroad crossing to require additional safety
precautions is traditionally and properly one to be reached by a
competent jury.

Whether a party is negligent in failing to

provide automatic gates is a material question of fact which is
almost always disputed by the parties.

DeElena v. Southern

Pacific Co., 592 P.2d 759 (Ariz. 1979); English v. Southern
Pacific Co., 45 P.2d 47.

("As a general rule it may be said that

whether ordinary care or reasonable prudence requires a railroad
company [to take additional precautions] at a crossing that is
especially dangerous is a question of fact for a jury to
determine . . .ff 45 P. 2d 50). As with most negligence actions,
summary judgment should be granted with great caution in an
action arising out of a crossing accident.

Williams v. Melby,

699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).
In our case there was more than ample evidence to
premise a finding that the Droubay Road crossing was extrahazardous.

Plaintiffs offered the affidavit of Robert Crommelin

who, after performing an on-site inspection of the crossing
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opined that it was indeed "extra-hazardous."

In rendering this

opinion he relied upon:
(a)

actual and projected traffic volume on the
roadway, including school buses.

(b)

train volume and speed.

(c)

angle of the crossing, 43°. 8

(d)

placement of existing warning signs at 300' and 51
away from the crossing.

(e)

evidence of other accidents at the crossing.10

By application of the above factors in a hazard rating index,
Crommelin arrived at the conclusion that the crossing did warrant
additional safeguards, specifically automatic crossing gates.
In order to grant Defendants1 Motions for Summary
Judgment, Judge Hanson struck or refused to consider the
Crommelin Affidavit mistakenly finding that his testimony lacked
an adequate foundation.

(R. 484). This was because Crommelin

had relied, in part, on information contained in surveillance
team inspection reports, which Defendants offered through the
Affidavits of Ross Wilson, Lillian Witkowsky, Woodrow Burnham and
Duncan Silver.

"This angle makes it extremely difficult for motorists to
judge the speed, distance and approach of trains nearing the
crossing." (R. at 189)
9

"Federal standards clearly mandate that such sign are to
be 750 1 in advance of a crossing in a rural area." (R. at 188).
10

As of the date of the Duncan accident, there had been
three similar accidents at the crossing.
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Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does require
an affiant to base his opinion upon specific facts.

However,

when the affiant is an expert witness, those specific facts need
not be independently admissible so long as they are of the sort
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and are
trustworthy and reliable.

Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence.

See

also, In re: Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.
Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) construing the similarly worded
Federal Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

As Crommelin was

relying upon an on-site inspection and the identical facts
utilized by Defendants' affiants, his testimony should have been
admitted and considered.

As it raised disputed issues of

material fact concerning the hazardous condition of the crossing,
summary judgment should have been denied.
Even without the Crommelin Affidavit, there is ample
evidence from which to find a disputed issue of material fact on
the question of the crossing being "extra-hazardous."
Defendants1 own UDOT surveillance team reports recommending
automatic crossing gates reveal the State and railroad had notice
of dangerous conditions but nonetheless failed to take curative
actions simply because "federal funds were unavailable."

And,

though evidence of prior accidents is inadmissible for purposes
of proving negligence, it is admissible to show the existence of
a danger or defect.

Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982.

And, the fact that automatic gates were ultimately installed by
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the State and railroad impeachs Defendants1 testimony that the
crossing was not "extra-hazardous."
In this case, exper4, i testified for the
railroad that the crossing was not extrahazardous. The fact that automatic signals
were installed on the crossing after the
accident would have been relevant for the
purpose of impeachment as well as feasibility.
Id. at 987.

See also, Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence.

In granting the Motions for Summary Judgment, the
District Court improperly struck Plaintiffs1 Affidavit and
ignored evidence of an "extra-hazardous" crossing contained
within Defendants1 own submissions.

Should the court find that

one or both of the Defendants are liable for inadequate signage
at railroad crossings, it must remand for a trial on the disputed
issue of whether the Droubay Road crossing was "extra-hazardous."
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court and the
Court of Appeals erred in absolving the Union Pacific Railroad
from liability as to inadequate warning devices at railroad
crossings in granting the State of Utah governmental immunity for
its decisions on upgrading such warning devices.

And as there is

more than sufficient evidence to find the Droubay Road crossing
"extra-hazardous" as would necessitate additional safeguards, the
District Court's Summary Judgment must be reversed and this
matter remanded for purposes of a trial on the merits of the
negligence claims.
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The Supreme Court cannot let stand rulings which deny
worthy Plaintiffs compensation for injuries sustained as a result
of dangerous conditions created by the Defendants.
Respectfully submitted this f h

day of October, 1990.

BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

MICHAEL A. KATZ
Attorneys for AppellTanTs
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Addenda

STATUTES

54-4-15. Grade crossings — Transportation department —
Commission — Regulation.
-Cj »

(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, highway or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be constructed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the permission of the Department of Transportation having first been secured: provided, that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully
existing tracks. The department shall have the right to refuse its permission
or to grant it upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe the
manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or
street railroad, and of a'street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types
of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and it shall
be its duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by school buses
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where in its
judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing
heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the
alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall
be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or
between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other public
authority in interest.
(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility,
the department may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and crossing.
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of
any dispute upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of the department pursuant to this section.
History: L. 1917. ch. 47, art. 4. 5 14: C.L.
1917, § 4811; R.S. 1933, 76-4-15: L. 1939. ch.
84.5 1;C. 1943. 76-4-15; L. 1975 U s i S . S . ^ c h .
9, § 17.
Cross-References. — Change of grades and
crossings. § 10-8-34.

Cities, power to regulate tracks. § 10-3-33.
Fences, cattle guards and street crossings.
§ 10-3-35.
Flagmen. gTade crossings and drams,
§ 10-S-36.

54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty of
transportation department to provide.
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall
as prescribed in this act provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic arid other safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of any
railroad or street railroad corporation in the state.
History: L. 1973, ch. 118, § 1; 1975 (1st
S.S.). ch. 9. $ 18.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this

act." referred to in this section, means L. 1973.
ch. 118. §§ 1 riirough 4, which appear at }§
54-4-15.1 through 54-4-L5.4.

54-4-15.2. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Funds
for payment of costs.
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall be used m
conjunction with other available moneys, including those received from federal sources, to pay all or part of the cost of the installation,
maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in
§ 54-4-15 1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any road over the
tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state
Histor> L 1973, ch. 118, § 2
Meaning of "this act" — See note under
this catchline following § 54-4 15 1

54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Apportionment of costs by transportation department
— Liability of cities, towns and counties —
Claims for payment of costs.
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the provisions of
§ 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in § 54-4-15 1
between the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved Unless
otherwise ordered by the department, the liability of cities, towns and counties to pay the share of maintenance cost assigned to the local agencies by the
department shall be limited to the funds provided under this act Payment of
any moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the basis of verified
claims filed with the Department of TransDortation by the railroad or street
railroad corporation responsible for the physical installation, maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device
Hisiorv L. 1973, ch
S S ), t h 9, * 19

118 5 3, 1975 (1st

Meaning of "this act" — See note juaer
this auchlme following * 54-4-15 I

56-1-11. Maintenance of crossings.
Eveiy l a i h o a d company shall be liable foi damages caused by its neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road
History- R.S 1898 & C L 1907, $ 445; C I,
1917, <j 1237; R S 1933 & C 1943, 77-0-11
Cioss-KcfcrcnccH — Gales at crossings,
* 10 8 83

Regulation of ciossmgs, <* 10 8 34 et seq
Stopping at ciossmgs, duties of buses and
certain tiucks, $ 41 6 97

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any mjuiy
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, load,
street, alley, ciosswalk, sidewalk, culveit, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, * 8.

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(0 arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) arises out of the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous waste; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or
seeding for the clearing of fog.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-10

(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of
fourth amendment rights.

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move w i t h e r without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon tell or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shalLb^e served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party*is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) F o r m of affidavits; further testimony; defense r e q u i r e d . Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible M evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, inducting reasonabl^attorney's fees, aniy^yjgHending paVty or,
Attorney may b e ^ a J ^ M i g ^ t y i p f contempt.
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(195.",), the appellant had failed to comply
with a trial court o r d e r in a divorce proceeding and had been found in contemj t
The Nevada S u p r e m e Court did not dismiss
his appeal for failure to comply with the
j u d g m e n t below, b u t held t h a t the appeal
would be dismissed unless the appellant
within 30 days submitted himself to the
process of the trial c o u r t or posted a supers e d e a s bond. Id. 280 P.2d a t 291. The
court stated'
[AJppellant husband is now a fugitive
from process of the trial court. We shall
not permit him to avail himself of jud cial
review while at the same time he places
himself beyond reach of the process of
the trial court in defiance of its a t t e m p t s
to enforce its j u d g m e n t . . .
We do but insist t h a t one seeking the
aid of the courts of this s t a t e should
r e m a i n t h r o u g h o u t the course of such
proceeding, amenable to all judicial process of the s t a t e which may issue in
connection with such proceeding.
Id. a t 291 (emphasis added).
T h e United States S u p r e m e Court considered an appellate c o u r t ' s dismissal of a
civil appeal on the basis t h a t the appellant
w a s in c o n t e m p t of the trial c o u r t ' s o r d e r in
National
Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99
L.Ed. 4fi (1954). The Court w a s asked to
decide w h e t h e r the Washington S u p r e m e
Court violated either the equal protection
c l a u s e or the due process clause of the
f o u r t e e n t h a m e n d m e n t when it dismissed
an appeal from a money j u d g m e n t as a
r e a s o n a b l e m e a s u r e for s a f e g u a r d i n g the
collectibility of t h a t j u d g m e n t . The appellant had filed a notice of appeal, but had
offered no s u p e r s e d e a s bond and had obtained no stay of the proceedings. Id. a t
39, 75 S.Ct. at 93-94. The trial court ordered the appellant to deliver certain bonds
in its possession to the court's receiver Tor
s a f e k e e p i n g pending disposition of the appeal. Id. The appellant refused and w a s
held in contempt
Id.
As a result, the
W a s h i n g t o n Supreme Court struck the ap2.

Utah Const art VIII, § S provides, in pertinent
part "Pxccpt for m a t t e r s filed o n g i n a l h with
the s u p r e m e court, there shall be in all cases an

peal on the merits, giving the apj "II** &
days to p u r g e its contempt by delivering
the bonds. Id. a t 40, 75 S.Ct at 94 H *
United S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t found r»o«*
stitutional violation, s t a t i n g that " ( * £ * »
s t a t u t o r y review is i m p o r t a n t and murt I t
exercised without discrimination. sucha»>
view is not a r e q u i r e m e n t of due prtw»»
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. a t 95. The C « *
stressed t h a t " [ p e t i t i o n e r ' s appeal » » * *
dismissed because of petitioner's faihtfr*
satisfy a j u d g m e n t pending an appeal 6«*>
it. It w a s dismissed b e c a u s e of i>etiui*irtl
failure to comply with t h e court's ortofb
s a f e g u a r d petitioner's a s s e t s from dMffr
tion pending such a p p e a l . " Id. at H 3
S.Ct. a t 96.
We are p e r s u a d e d t h a t the Clomt +
proach is most c o n s i s t e n t with tb* Vwk
Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and &*
United S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s Arnold I*
cision. By adopting this approach, wtt*
not deny appellant her r i g h t to an afffli
under Utah Const, a r t . VIII, § 5. 1 b u t * * *
er insist she m u s t s u b m i t herself !• 6 *
jurisdiction of the trial court and « J M %
that court's concerns before she maj tM*
cise t h a t right. She merely ha> iKt Kb
gation to come f o r w a r d and offer a reHMfr
able alternative to the trial court to id*
g u a r d her a s s e t s from dissipation pe*4ig
her appeal.
Appellant w a s given the opi*>rtua^ I*
post a s u p e r s e d e a s bond, but ha* rttWm
She has ignored the orders of the Mft
court and, a p a r t from o b t a n m g a W*|*
rary stay which s h e allowed to lap** I *
w a n t of a bond, s h e has provided ** * *
sonable a l t e r n a t i v e to allow tht* o>*^ %
insure t h a t her a s s e t s a r e available tt> wfl*
fy the j u d g m e n t pending appeal. B? %*"
actions, appellant is frustrating th* arfMN^
istration of justice.
Appellant h a s not claimed that *fc* # i
not have t h e ability to comply with \h* V&
court's order. See Stewart
v Strwm^iM
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 iHtoH H i
situation is similar to one faced hj i Ql»
appeal of right from the court ol <" *:*» 0&
diction to a court with appellate p*n*B*&1k
o\cr the cause."

DUNCAN v. UNION P A C I F I C R. CO.

Utah

Cite as 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App 1990)

court, where it found it was "dealing
i bugant who not only has previously
to appear as ordered, b u t who up to
m y time remains a fugitive from jusApparently, he is unwilling to red to a court order with which he disbut seeks to obtain on a p p e a l " a
r favorable result. Tobin v. Casaus,
CalApp.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
• t therefore hold that appellant h a s 30
«9§£rpfn the date of the issuance of this
q0taM to bring herself within the process
4 f * r trial court. If appellant submits
to the trial court, she should be
I an opportunity to offer alternatives
i trial court to protect the judgment,
nt may persuade the court it should
fcftftfW disputed judgment a m o u n t in t r u s t
I t f l a resolution of this appeal on the
• ^
However, if appellant p e r s i s t s in
herself in violation of the trial
ft orders, her appeal will be dismissed
* * f expiration of the 30-day period.

CAEFF and ORME. JJ . concur.
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Shelly Bowers; S h e r r y B o w e r s ; M o n i c a
llenwood. individually and as personal
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of i h e E s t a t e of R a m o n
H e n w o o d , deceased; P h y l l i s H e n wood;
a n d Owen H e n w o o d , Plaintiffs a n d Appellants,
v.
UNION P A C I F I C R A I L R O A D
NY, a c o r p o r a t i o n ; T h e S t a t e
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1
100, inclusive, D e f e n d a n t s a n d
dents.

COMPAof U t a h ;
through
Respon-

No. 890291-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 12, 1990.

Heirs of victims of train-automobile accident b r o u g h t action a g a i n s t railroad, Dep a r t m e n t of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and railroad
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., e n t e r e d
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t dismissing wrongful
death action. Heirs appealed. T h e C o u r t
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior District J u d g e , held that: (1) heirs failed to
establish t h a t either e n g i n e e r or railroad
were negligent, and (2) D e p a r t m e n t , h a v i n g
given a t least some w a r n i n g or control a t
railroad crossing, was g o v e r n m e n t a l l y immune in deciding w h e t h e r to improve
means of warning or control a t crossing
because of fiscal effects of decision.
Affirmed.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.

1. R a i l r o a d s <3=>348(1)
• Dt'NCAN, individually a n d a s perrtpreaentative of the E s t a t e of
Duncan, deceased; J a s o n E.
, a minor by and t h r o u g h his
i ad Litem; Alice D u n c a n ; NoDuncan. Michael D u n c a n ; T i m
Kevin D u n c a n ; B r i a n D u n : Michelle Bowers, individually a n d
• t m o n a l representative of t h e E s t a t e
<4hAt*y and Nicole B o w e r s , d e c e a s e d ;
Bowers;
Florence
Hanson;

Evidence failed to s u p p o r t claim of
heirs of accident victims t h a t t h e r e w a s
negligence in operation of train or e n t r u s t ing its operation to e n g i n e e r who w a s in
charge at time of automobile-train collision.
2. R a i l r o a d s @=>348(2)
Evidence did not s u p p o r t claim of heirs
of accident victims that railroad negligently
maintained railroad right-of-way a t crossing with s t r e e t where train-automobile collision occurred; there was nothing to indicate what could have m a d e railroad's right-
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of-way safer to motorist crossing since
path of train was clearly visible to oncoming motorists.
3. R a i l r o a d s <£=>303(1)
Railroad h a s t o r t duty to maintain its
rights-of-way in condition safe to motorists
who t r a v e r s e them a t established crossings.
4. R a i l r o a d s e=»303( I)
Railroad is required to take precautions to prevent injury to motorists crossing railroad right-of-way if reasonable person in railroad's position would take such
precautions
5. R a i l r o a d s ©=303(1)
In determining w h a t is reasonable under the circumstances for railroad crossing"
every railroad crossing is h a z a r d o u s but,
since it is not practicable to eliminate all
railroad crossings, simple existence of railroad crossing is not in itself a breach of
d u t y of care.
6. R a i l r o a d s <3=>303(1)
For railroad to be liable for crossing
mishap, t h e r e must be something about
railroad's right-of-way t h a t c r e a t e s hazard
to motorist g r e a t e r than hazard presented
by simple fact that railroad and s t r e e t intersect.
7. R a i l r o a d s 0=303(1)
Railroad is required to t a k e every reasonable action to a s s u r e safety of motorist
who can reasonably be expected to cross
right-of-way and in determining w h a t is
r e a s o n a b l e under circumstances of specific
case, trier of fact m u s t ultimately weigh
b u r d e n on railroad, and indirectly on public,
of requiring added precautions, against
benefits t h a t would be derived by public at
large from precautions.
8. R a i l r o a d s <S=>307(2, 3)
It was not responsibility of railroad to
place signs and devices on public road
w a r n i n g motorists of railroad crossing.
9. S t a t e s ®=>112(1)
Governmental immunity shields sover
eign policy making and discretion from
s t a : e law dama?*- claims b \ generally pr<^
c . I K L " £ <Ms~Ji£t: '.i&t«:.;\> f««r p*rfonr&r.ce • :

IJUHH.AW V. HINI
IFIN PAtint: K.
Cite as 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App 1990)

g o v e r n m e n t a l function subject to certain
statutorily e n u m e r a t e d waivers.

Before BENCH and .JACKSON, JJ.,
and BULLOCK,' Senior District J u d g e .

10. A u t o m o b i l e s <S=>277
D e p a r t m e n t of Transportation enjoyed
governmental immunity from liability in action b r o u g h t by heirs of train-automobile
accident victims alleging that safety improvements at railroad crossing were inadequate
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10.

OPINION

11. M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s '£='724
Test for determining governmental immunity is w h e t h e r activity u n d e r consideration is of such unique n a t u r e that it can
only be performed by governmental agency
or t h a t it is essential to core of governmental activity, and u n d e r t h a t test, court diamines n a t u r e of activity itself, not identity
of person performing activity.
12. A u t o m o b i l e s <s=279
Government may be held liable in tort
for failure to provide some effective waning or control for traffic a t city inters**
tion; however, d u t y to provide some effertive w a r n i n g or control m u s t be disU*
guished from m o r e t h a n minimal maictr
nance and from e n h a n c e m e n t of means of
providing w a r n i n g and control.
13. A u t o m o b i l e s o=>279
H i g h w a y s <3=>194
As long as w a r n i n g or control Mgnaft
of clear hazard is in existence and maa*tained enough to give it minimal effecti**
ness, g o v e r n m e n t is not liable in tort im
failure to b e t t e r maintain or to enhaaot
signage.

Michael A. K a t z (argued), Burbidtf* i
Mitchell, Salt L a k e City, for appellant*,
J. Clare Williams (argued), Larr\ A (ia*
lenbein, Salt Lake City, for respond***
Union Pacific R. Co. and Paul Kleuuai*.
Allan L. L a r s o n (argued), Craig Kari**.
Anne Swenson, Snow, Christensen & Mar*
neau, Salt Lake City, R. Paul Van l%a\
S t a t e Atty. Gen., S t e p h e n J
S^mm
A<st Atty Gen , Salt Lake Cit\ fur m
-pondent S l a t e of V t a h

co.
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UDOT's prioritization of the S t a t e ' s railroad crossings to receive additional safety
improvements, such as electrified lights
and c r o s s b a r s

J ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior District
Judge.

The heirs of the accident victims sued
Union Pacific and engineer Kleinman for
negligent operation of the train, negligent
maintenance of the railroad right of way a t
the Droubay Road crossing, and for ent r u s t i n g operation of the train to an allegedly unfit employee. The heirs also sued
the State, claiming t h a t the safety improvements a t the crossing w e r e inadequate.
All of the d e f e n d a n t s moved for s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t , and the district c o u r t g r a n t e d
their motions and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiffs appealed.

Plaintiffs appeal from a s u m m a r y judgment dismissing their wrongful death action arising out of a train-automobile collision. We affirm.
Droubay Road is a two-lane thoroughfare running north and south in rural
Tooele County. At one point, it intersects
the Union Pacific Railroad tracks at approximately a 43-degree angle on the north
and a 136-degree angle on the south.
Three roadside signs warn oncoming motortets of the crossing, one sign located
about 300 feet from the crossing, and two
on either side of the road 19 feet from the
crossing. There are no flashing lights or
aa«chanical devices at the crossing to warn
•f an approaching train, but nothing obstructs a motorist's view of the tracks for
•everal thousand feet.

CLAIMS A G A I N S T U N I O N PACIFIC

In defense a g a i n s t the motions for summary j u d g m e n t , the plaintiffs filed an affidavit of one Robert Crommelin, a traffic
safety engineer. In Crommelin's opinion,
"the w a r n i n g signs p r e s e n t a t the crossing
were clearly i n a d e q u a t e " and " t h e intersecOn the evening of April 9, 1983, a t about
tion [was] clearly ' e x t r a h a z a r d o u s . ' " The
la&O p m., a Union Pacific train operated by district court, however, s t r u c k Crommelin's
ftwl Kleinman struck an automobile and
affidavit on the g r o u n d s t h a t 23 U.S.C.
tolled all four occupants of the vehicle a t
§ 409 (Supp. 1989) forbade admission into
tfce Droubay Road crossing. There is no evidence of the factual basis for Crommemdence to indicate that the train was neg- lin's conclusions, and Utah Rule of Civil
aftntly or improperly operated, and its
P r o c e d u r e 56(e) permits only affidavits
atadlight, warning bells, and whistles were
which s t a t e "such facts as would be admisactivated well in advance of the crossing. sible in evidencel.J" Crommelin's opinion
TV
was based partly on information gained
engineer, Kleinman, averred that he
from U D O T ' s records of the Droubay Road
awr the car approach the crossing but be- crossing. To facilitate candor in adminishrttd that it would stop When it became trative evaluations of h i g h w a y safety hazajfmrvnt that the car was not going to ards, 23 U.S.C. § 409 p r e v e n t s a court from
«*•?, it was too late for him to stop the receiving records of such evaluations into
tlML
evidence. 2 Therefore, u n d e r this federal
The Utah Department of Transportation
statute,
the
documents
from
which
COOT) periodically evaluated the Droubay
Crommelin obtained a large p a r t of the
fcaad crossing in planning the allocation of
data used in reaching his conclusions were
to np^urces, including federal funding, for
inadmissible.
Htfe-wide highway improvements. Under
Ataielhods used at the time, the Droubay
On t h a t basis, the district c o u r t struck
feaad crossing did not rank high enough in Crommelin's affidavit. However, the dis1

I Robert Bullock, Senioi District Judge, sit
• m b> special appointment pursuant to Utah
Odt Ann <» 78-3-24(10) (Supp 1089)

2.

The legislative purpose of section 409 can be
gleaned from H.Conf Rep. No. 100-^7. 104th
Cong. 1st Sess. 172-173, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin News 66, 156-57.
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trict court also ruled that, even if the affidavit were considered, the case should be
dismissed on its merits. Faced with these
alternative grounds for the same result, we
choose on appeal in this case to rest our
decision on the merits. We will thus take
Crommelin's opinion at face value.

condition safe to motorists who traverse
them at established crossings.4 However,
there seems to be a lack of clarity about
the standard of care required of the railroad in the observance of this duty, and
this apparent lack of clarity has led to
some criticism of the Utah standard of care
as it was understood.5 Since we must apply a standard of care in determining
whether Union Pacific breached its duty,
we attempt to state clearly the extent to
which a railroad must make its right of
way safe for motorists to cross.

11] Even if Crommelin's affidavit is considered, plaintiffs did not show that Union
Pacific breached any duty of care in the
collision at the Droubay Road crossing.
Plaintiffs alleged negligence in the operation of the train by Kleinman and, through
[4] The confusion concerning the stanrespondent superior, by Union Pacific, as dard of care centers in the meaning of the
well- as negligence by Union Pacific in em- words "more than ordinarily hazardous,"
ploying an unfit train operator and in main- which were used in applying the standard
taining its right of way. Plaintiffs also of care in two Utah cases, Bridges v. Vnsought punitive damages from Union Pacif- ion Paeifie R.R. Co., 26 Utah 2d 281. 488
ic for willful and reckless conduct. Plain- P.2d 738 (1971), and English v. Southern
tiffs introduced no evidence to show that Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47 (1896L
the train was negligently operated, much These words were never intended to impose
less that the collision was willfully and a standard of care higher thin ordinary
recklessly caused, and no evidence to show care, the degree of care exercised by i
that Kleinman was unfit to operate the reasonable person under the circumstanctrain. Kleinman avers that he operated the es.* Thus, the railroad is required to take
train properly. Of course, Kleinman's tes- precautions to prevent injury to crossing
timony is biased, and there are no known motorists if a reasonable person in the railwitnesses surviving the crash other than road's position would take such precauUnion Pacific employees. Nevertheless, tions.7
lacking any evidence to the contrary, we
[5, 61 In determining what is reasonable
conclude that plaintiffs failed to show negligence in operating the train or in entrust- under the circumstances of a railroad
crossing, it is obvious that every railroad
ing its operation to Kleinman.3
crossing is hazardous, but, since it is wrt
r (2] The only claim against Union Pacifpracticable to eliminate all railroad crowic on which evidence was introduced was in gs, the simple existence of a railroad
the claim for negligent maintenance of the < rossing is not in itself a breach of a Juty
railroad right of way, which is supported, of care. Much of everyday life present!
from plaintiffs' point of view, by Cromme- hazards; driving or walking along a street
lin's affidavit. We therefore proceed to are hazardous, and so are stairs, electricity,
consider this claim.
and many other things, but we toleralf
[31 It is settled that a railroad has a those hazards because of the impractical
tort duty to maintain its rights of way in a ty of eliminating them. In determifwf
3.

See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v.
Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382. 1385 (Utah 1989);
Creekview
Apartments
v. State Farm Ins. Co,
771 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct.App.1989).

4.

Cleave v Denver & Rio Grande W R R. Co..
749 P 2d 660. 662-64 (Utah Ct.App 1988)

5.

Wilde v. Denver A Rw Grande W R R. Co., No.
C-83-149J, slip op. at 16. 1985 W U 7 3 7 0 (D.Ut.
April 3. 1985)

6.
7.

English,

whether a mishap involving one of those
Hazards is tortious, the question is not
whether a hazard existed, but rather
whether, under prevailing community standards, the defendant should bear the responsibility to discover and ameliorate a
hazard, in light of the practicability of dong so and the costs and benefits to society
of requiring the defendant so to act.8 In
the case of railroad crossings, the cost of
eliminating the hazard, such as by installing overpasses at all railroad crossings,
ncluding rural ones, does not warrant a
duty of care so rigorous that simply having
a railroad cross a street is tortious. Rather, for a railroad to be liable for a crossing
saishap, there must be something about the
railroad's right of way that creates a hazard to motorists greater than the hazard
presented by the simple fact that the railroad and the street intersect.
IT J In determining what is reasonable
ID require of a railroad in its tort liability
for crossings, it would thus be error to hold
that the railroad right of way cannot cross
• street. However, for such a crossing, the
nilroad is required to take every reasonable action to assure the safety of motorics who can reasonably be expected to
cross the right of way. In determining
what is reasonable under the circumstances
rf a speciiic case, the trier of fact must
•Itonately .veigh the burden on the railraad, and indirectly on the public, of requires; added precautions, against th? benefits
tisat would be derived by the public at large
from such precautions For example, in
fte Gleave case," wild vegetation on the
f%ht of way obscured oncoming trains
from motorists at the crossing. The cost
tf removing or maintaining the vegetation
wis minimal compared to the enormous
wttefit to the public of being able to see an
^Uroaching train at a frequent crossing.

45 P. at 50.

See Meese v. Brigham Young Vntv. 63^ tM
720 (Utah 1981); Wlittman v. W.T. Grant L+.*
Utah 2d 8 1 . 395 P.2d 918 (1964); Restaie«Si
( S e c o n d ) of Torts § 283 (196S).

% See hrtckwn v. Walgteen Drug Co., 120 Utah
I t 232 P 2d 210, 31 A L R 2d 1 7 7 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ; Wag
mm v Waterside, lm , 744 P.2d 1012, 1013
ftWi App 1987)
*

Cltmw v Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.,
* * P 2 d 660. 662-64 (Utah 1988)

Wk l u h Code Ann. § S4-4-15 1 (1990)

The imposition of a tort duty on the railroad to remove or maintain the vegetation
was therefore clearly correct.
(81 In this case, there is nothing to indicate what could have made Union Pacific's
right of way safer to motorists crossing on
Droubay Road. The path of the train is
clearly visible to oncoming motorists.
Plaintiffs suggest that Union Pacific
should have placed warning signs and devices on Droubay Road, including automatic gates blocking traffic on the Road from
crossing the tracks when a train was approaching. It is not, however, the responsibility of the railroad to place signs and
devices on the public road. The railroad
must maintain its own right of way, but it
is not under any duty to place signs or
devices on the public road.
The design and maintenance of state
roads and the control of traffic on state
roads are UDOT's responsibilities and prerogatives.10 At common law, this responsibility at railroad crossings was shared with
the railroad.1' Thus, in English, the railroad was found liable for failing to flag
motorists on an intersecting city street.
Since English, however, UDOT has been
established, and the Legislature invested
UDOT with "power to determine and prescribe the manner
of . . . protection of
each crossing." ,2 Although that responsibility in no way reduces the railroad's responsibility to maintain its right of way,13 it
would nevertheless, under ordinary circumstances, place the railroad in the role of
meddler, trespasser, or usurper if the railroad were to put signs on the public road
or forbid traffic on the public road from
crossing its right of way. Union Pacific
therefore had no duty to place signs or
roadblocking devices on Droubay Road,
11. Although we hold that the r a i l r o a d d o e s not
have a u t h o n t y 01 icsponsibility to place signs o r
roadblocks on the public road, w e note that the
cost of protecting users of the public road continues !o be shared with the railroad p u r s u a n t
to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.3 (1990).
12.

Utah Code Ann § 54-4-15(2) (1990).

13.

Gleave,

749 P 2d at 664
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and it is not liable in tort for its failure to
do so.
CLAIMS ACiAINST UDOT
(9,101 Governmental
immunity
is
UDOT's principal defense 11 against plaintiffs. Governmental immunity shields sovereign policy-making and discretion from
state-law damage claims by generally precluding damage liability for performance of
a governmental function, subject to certain
statutorily enumerated waivers.15
Resolution of the governmental immunity question in this case is controlled by
Cleave, which held that UDOT was governmentally immune in determining the precise method to be used in warning persons
on a public road approaching a railroad
crossing. We follow Gleave, and hold that
UDOT is immune in this case. We add,
however, a few comments to address the
particular arguments of counsel in this
case.
I l l ] Plaintiffs cite Bowen v. Riverton
City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) in an attempt to avoid governmental immunity. In
Bowen, the Utah Supreme Court reversed
a summary judgment in favor of Riverton
in a tort action. Bowen asserted that a
stop sign at a busy Riverton intersection
was lying on the ground as Bowen and
another vehicle collided in the intersection.

Bowen came after the pathbreaking Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
12X0 (Utah 1980), but did not cite Standiford or refer to its test for "governmental
function," the threshold of governmental
immunity analysis. Standiford held that
the test for determining governmental immunity is "whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it
can only be performed by a governmental
agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental activity." Standiford. 605
P.2d at 1236-37. Under this test, we examine the nature of the activity itself, not the
identity of the person performing the activity. In this case, for example, the activity
in question consists of designing and maintaining a road. It would make the analysis
tautological to define the activity as designing and maintaining a public or governmental road.,fi
As Judge Jackson points out in his separate concurring opinion, the absence in
Bowen of a reference to Standiford could
simply be a result of the procedural posture of the Bowen case. Possibly the only
issues before the court in Bowen were the
elements of Boweris prima facie case, and
the court did not reach the issue of governmental immunity because it is a defense,
rather than an element of the prima facie
case. However, Bowen's emphasis on Riv-

i m m u n i t y of officials is not in issue, nor h a *
14. Wc logically d o not reach the affirmative
plaintiffs raised constitutional a r g u m e n t s sixh
defense of g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y w i t h o u t first
as those considered in Condemarin
v. University
d e t e r m i n i n g or p r e s u m i n g that a plaintiff h a s
Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
established a p r i m a facie case. See Ferree v.
State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). How16. In a d o p t i n g its test for governmental funcever, while UDOT's p r i m a facie liability w a s
tion, Standiford
r e n o u n c e d the earlier governp e r h a p s implicitly p t e s u m e d in the district
m e n t a l / p r o p r i e t a r y distinction because of m
c o u t t ' s reasoning, the district court did not exconsistencies that had developed over the courir
pressly review plaintiffs' p r i m a facie claim
of its application.
against UDOT. We a r e reluctant to delve into
I.ike the Standiford
test, the govcrnme»
an issue on which the tiial court has not ex
t a l / p r o p r i e t a r y distinction w a s originally mcatf
pressly ruled, for the r e a s o n s explained in Zions
to restrict the application of governmental imFirst Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
munity.
However, in t i m e , the governme*
749 P.2d 6S1, 6S4 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we
t a l / p r o p r i e t a r y analysis d e g e n e r a t e d from rt$i
choose to rest our decision on g o v e r n m e n t a l
thought of its m e a n i n g to simple catcgori/ai**
i m m u n i t y and p r e s u m e for p u r p o s e s of argu
of the activity in question as involving a gotf
ment (but d o not hold) that the plaintiffs have
c o u r s e , a park, a hospital, etc. To some cxlr*.
stated a p r i m a facie case of negligence by
the s a m e c o n s e q u e n c e s c a n result from a faok
UDOT. See Kirk \>. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 125S
categorization a p p r o a c h u n d e r the Standtfamt
(Utah App.1989).
test. We therefore decline U> m a k e an cntr* m
15. See Utah Code Arm. § 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 (1989).
a l a u n d r y list of g o v e r n m e n t a l functions per *.
The scope of the g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y issue
e l i m i n a t i n g all thought in future cases of lift
in this case is limited. Plaintiffs have not sued
basic test established in
Standiford.
any governmental p e r s o n n e l , a n d therefore, the

Cite as 790 P.2d S95 (Utah App. 1990)

erton's duty to maintain streets becomes
rather disingenuous lip service if Riverton
had a viable defense of governmental immunity against all liability based on that
duty. While procedurally it is important to
observe the distinction between plaintiff's
prima facie case and defendant's defenses,
in a more basic sense, what is ultimately
important is the scope of governmental reiponsibility, which, in a well-pleaded case,
» a function both of prima facie liability
and available defenses. It would also seem
to be a waste of resources to reverse and
remand Bowen for a trial on the negligence
question if there was no way for Bowen to
recover due to governmental immunity.

government is not liable in tort for its
failure to better maintain or to enhance the
signage. If the signage has some cognizable effect in warning or controlling traffic
at a clear hazard, its maintenance and improvement ;*re governmental functions for
which the government is immune from suit
in Utah courts.

It. Not e\ery governmental activity that affects
ifcc public fisc is a governmental function.
Clearly nongovernmental functions, such as
providing utility services oi recreation, or serv
m$ process, may be financed in pait by funds
•fcuined through governmental revenue exacttom, and liability incurred in performing those
foauions will be satisfied out of the public
treasury. See Schultz v. Conger, 7S5 P.2d 165
(U*h 1988); Dalton v. Salt Fake Suburban
Sani
*r> tkst., 676 I\2d 399 (Utah 1984); Thomas v.
Omriteld City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982); John
mm » Salt Uke city Corp.. 629 P.2d 432 (Utah

1981). However, the s o u r c e s of funds to conduct the activity or to pay an eventual j u d g m e n t
d o not d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the activity in question is a g o v e r n m e n t a l function. In this case,
d i s r e g a r d i n g the fact that the funds for railroad
crossings m a y d c i i v e in part from public
sources, wc a r e nevertheless left with an overridmgly fiscal question: H o w m u c h to spend on
each railroad c r o s s i n g that could be improved.
Wc believe that the g o v e r n m e n t a l budgeting and
spending involved in d e c i d i n g h o w to improve
the safety of r a i l r o a d crossings suffice to m a k e
that dec ision a g o v e r n m e n t a l function.

Highway maintenance and improvement
are predominately ,7 fiscal matters. Every
highway could probably be made safer by
further expenditures, but we will not hold
UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety
and the burden of funding improvements.
112,13] Bowen*
emphasis on the As we pointed out in Gleave, and as UDOT
government's duty in tort to assure safe emphasizes here, there are hundreds of
itreets is entirely consistent with Standiunelectrified railroad crossings in Utah,
ford, if we accept the premise that the
and it is not fiscally feasible to equip them
decision whether to exert any control at all
all with the best possible means of assurover intersecting traffic is not a governing traffic safety. Rather, UDOT priorimental function giving rise to immunity
tizes the crossings in allocating the limited
from tort liability. In other words, the
government may be held liable in tort to funds available for crossing improvements.
provide some effective warning or control The role of the judiciary in that prioritizafor traffic at a city intersection. However, tion and allocation process is strictly limittfct duty to provide some effective warning ed. In a case seeking judicial review of
m control must be distinguished from more that administrative process, we would exertkan tuinimal maintenance and from en- cise our reviewing function with deference
hancement of the means of providing warn- to the administrative agency under the "arttg and control. The case of Richards v. bitrary and capricious" standard. HowUontt, 716 P.2d 27b' (Utah 1985) (per cu- ever, in a tort action such as this, the
nun) required compliance with the notice deference to a governmental function is
requirements of governmental immunity absolute unless waived, and we do not refor i claim based on allegedly inadequate view it at all under tort principles.
•aintenance of a stop sign. From a comIn this case, we are not presented with a
p»»on of Bowen and Richards and in lack of any effective control of traffic,
Ifht of Gleave, we conclude that as long as since there are three signs on Droubay
•lrning or control signage of a clear haz- Road where it approaches the railroad.
wd is in existence and maintained enough The basis asserted here for recovery
fc jfive it minimal effectiveness, the against UDOT is its failure to better warn

o
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and control traffic at the crossing. Since
we have concluded t h a t UDOT is immune
for its failure to do more than minimal
w a r n i n g and control, we hold t h a t plaintiffs
cannot recover a g a i n s t UDOT or the State.
CONCLUSION
We therefore hold in this case that, even
considering the Crommelin affidavit and
considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, they failed to
show any negligence by Union Pacific in
t h e design and maintenance of its right of
way. Union Pacific is not responsible for
controlling traffic on s t a t e roads, and the
s t a t e , having given a t least some warning
or control at this railroad crossing, is gove r n m e n t a l l y immune in deciding w h e t h e r to
improve the means of w a r n i n g or control at
the crossing because of the fiscal effects of
such a decision
T h u s , these plaintiffs have not shown
negligence by the railroad in the accident
a t this crossing, w h e r e the oncoming train
w a s clearly visible from a lengthy distance
on the road toward the crossing, and the
train was not shown to have been negligently operated. Signs notified approaching drivers of the crossing, but UDOT is
not liable for not having expended more
funds in making more extensive safety imp r o v e m e n t s t h a t might have prevented the
accident. The net effect of this holding is
t h a t if the railroad's r i g h t of way does not
negligently obscure an oncoming train, the
train is properly operated, and if some visible w a r n i n g sign a g e is p r e s e n t on the
public road, then the plaintiff is not entitled
to relief in tort for an injury at the crossing. We do not consider this outcome to be
h a r s h or unjust, a l t h o u g h any tragedy in
which life is lost or impaired is regrettable,
w h a t e v e r the cause.
The dismissal of the plaintiffs' case is
affirmed.
B E N C H , J., concurs.
J A C K S O N , J u d g e (concurring):
Although I concur in the result reached
by the majority and in most of its analysis,
I write separately to disassociate myself

from the faulty analysis of the governor
tal immunity issue. Contrary to the mia*
ity's characterization, supra at 6, UDOft
general activity in this case does not ca>
sist of "designing and maintaining a roat*
It consists of t h e installation and impiw
m e n t of traffic safety devices and signs«
railroad crossings.
As for the specific
purportedly negligent act by UDOT, pba
tiffs in this case alleged t h a t UDOT neffr
gently failed to install a different, presaa
ably safer, kind of traffic w a r n i n g device*
a railroad crossing. The s a m e claims wot
raised by t h e plaintiff in Gleave v. Denmt
& Rio Grande
W.R., 749 P.2d 660 llua
Ct App.) f cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (!*$&
As the majority recognizes, t h e outcome*
this case is controlled by Gleave, in wh**
we held t h a t (1) UDOT's g e n e r a l activity*
evaluating, installing, maintaining, and a>
proving safety signals or devices at rmroad crossings is a governmental functws
within Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 l l * §
u n d e r the t e s t set forth in Standijord t,
Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230il'ta*
1980); and (2) t h e specific act of t'DQS
which the plaintiff claimed was negltgw*
i.e., the failure to u p g r a d e safety device**
a particular railroad crossing, arose out**
the exercise of a discretionary functws
u n d e r the t e s t in Little v. Utah State fti
of Family
Sens.,
667 P.2d 49, 51 (IfiA
1988), for which immunity had not beat
waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1*1
(1986).
T h e majority a p p e a r s unaware of &*
two-step analysis—used, for example. •
Gleave and Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores v Srf
Lake City Corp.', 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 15**
—that is n e c e s s a r y to resolve a govemiata
tal immunity claim in which the paru»
contest whether, even if the general art**
ty is a g o v e r n m e n t a l function, the alleged^
negligent act arose o u t of the exercise of*
"discretionary function" under section &*
30-10(1). If the g e n e r a l activity under tm
.^deration is not a governmental funrta*
within t h e m e a n i n g of section 63-30-3. \bm
t h e r e is no immunity. If the general art*»
ty is a g o v e r n m e n t a l function, then tat
Little t e s t m u s t be applied to determine i
the specific, allegedly negligent art m
omission is purely discretionary under mt

as 790

P.2d
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tea 64-30- 10(l)(a) If it is purely discreaoaarv. then immunity has not been
aaned by section 63-30-10(l)(a). If it is
art purely discretionary, then immunity
aw been waived by section 63-30-10(1).
TVe failure to appreciate the difference
artween these two distinct inquiries apparmtij underlies the majority's confusing atl to harmonize the results in Bowen v.
rion City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)
aai Rurhards v. Leavitt,
716 P.2d 276
tVtaa 1985) (per curiam) with
Standiford
mm G/eare. Governmental immunity was
tut even an issue in Bowen, a case involv* f t»e allegedly negligent failure of the
at? lo maintain a stop sign t h a t had been
iaacked down, so it is not really surprising
aatf no mention was made of
Standiford.
% a the substance of the issues actually
i and of the tacit assumptions made in
not the case's procedural posture,
at a important. The s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
£aror of the city, which the s u p r e m e
art reversed in Bowen, had been g r a n t e d
»tae basis that the city was not negligent
ta Matter of law on the undisputed facts;
a wmmary judgment was not g r a n t e d on
a baits of any immunity. The first unassumption in Bowen, which was
quently the express holding in LeavaX TW P.2d at 279, is t h a t the maintenance
flat repair of traffic signs is a government s faction Leavitt, which also involved a
ahty's failure to maintain a traffic
device at a highway intersection,
aatrtittd another issue not raised in Bowmi u , whether immunity for the exercise
at taat governmental function had been
aatatonly waived. The court in Bowen
• n d y assumed that it had, or the summaty axifpnent in favor of the municipality
mtM kave been affirmed on the a l t e r n a t e
fftaad of immunity. The Leavitt
court
aartidid that the immunity provided to
a*e*v by section 63-30-3 for its activities
• aaaitaining traffic control devices had
a a a expressly waived by section
63-J0-8
"aw any injury caused by a defective, unaaV or dangerous condition of any high*m, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sideaak. culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
aaar structure located thereon." Relying

(UtahApp.

Utah

603

1990)

on its prior decision in Bigelow v. Ingersoll,
618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), decided two y e a r s
before Bowen,
the Leavitt
c o u r t reaffirmed t h a t the e x p r e s s waiver of immunity in section 6 3 - 3 0 - 8 is not subject to the
section 63-30-10(l)(a) discretionary function exception to the waiver of immunity.
The court thus read section 6 3 - 3 0 - 8 a s
expressing the legislature's view t h a t an
act or omission in the exercise of a governmental function t h a t created a "defective,
unsafe, or d a n g e r o u s condition" on a public
way could never involve activity a t the
basic policy-making level for which immunity is preserved by section 63-30-10(1 )(a).
Unlike the plaintiffs in Leavitt and Bigelow, however, b u t exactly like the injured
plaintiff and appellant railroad in Gleave,
749 P.2d at 667 & n. 6, the plaintiffs in this
case have never pleaded or contended t h a t
the discretionary function analysis u n d e r
section 63-30-10(l)(a) is u n n e c e s s a r y and
irrelevant because the d e c e d e n t s ' injuries
resulted from an unsafe or d a n g e r o u s condition on a road within the purview of
section 63-30-8. Instead, they asked t h e
trial court and us to overrule one of the
two aforementioned holdings in Gleave and
conclude either t h a t (1) UDOT's evaluation,
installation, maintenance, and improvement
of safety signals or devices a t railroad
crossings is not a g o v e r n m e n t a l function
within section 6 3 - 3 0 - 3 ; or (2) UDOT's failure to install u p g r a d e d safety devices a t
the subject railroad crossing did not arise
out of a section 63-30-10(l)(a) discretionary
function.
Since my colleagues and I have unanimously declined t h e invitation to a b a n d o n
Gleave, it is u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t the majority
adds confusion to an already difficult a r e a
of law in its flawed analysis of Leavitt and
Bowen, which should be d i s r e g a r d e d as

dicta.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LEWIS DUNCAN, individually and
as personal representative of
the Estate of PATRICK DUNCAN,
deceased, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. 84-146

Plaintiffs,
vs
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

The above-referenced matter came before the Court for oral
argument en November 12, 1987.

Counsel for the various parties

appeared and argued their respective positions.

Prior to the

oral argument, the parties had submitted Memoranda of Poinds and
Authorities, as well as Affidavits and other documentary evidence
addressing the issues raised in the various Motions.

Following

oral argument, the Court ruled from the bench on portions of the
defendant

Union

Pacific

Railroad's

Motion for Summary Judgment.

(hereinafter

"Railroad")

The remainder of the Motions were

taken under advisement for further consideration of the issues
raised.
Memoranda
submitted,

The

Court

of
and

has

Points
being

Memorandum Decision.

and

since

argument, again reviewed the

Authorities,

fully

advised,

and
enters

other

materials

the

following
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MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY GRANTED
As

indicated

above, the

Court granted

Railroad's Motion for Summary Judgment.

a portion of the

From the bench, at the

conclusion of oral argument, the Court determined that there was
no evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Railroad
operated the train in a negligent manner.

To the contrary, the

only evidence presented went to the proposition that the train
was

operated

in

a

reasonable, safe and prudent manner.

In

addition, there was no evidence offered by the plaintiffs that
suggested

that

their

claim

Kleinman, was incompetent.
again

to

the

contrary,

that

the

engineer,

co-defendant

The only evidence before the Court is
and

establishes

that

Kleinman was a competent and qualified engineer.

the

defendant

Therefore, the

Railroad and Kleinman's Motions for Summary Judgment on those
issues were granted.

There was also a Morion to Strike a portion

of the plaintiffs' Brief that contained inappropriate comments.
The plaintiff did net object, and the Metier, was granted, and the
word

"murdered"

in plaintiffs' Brief was stricken pursuant to

Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of an automobile/train collision that
occurred

on April

S,

1983, at

approximately

8:50

p.m.

The

collision took place at the crossing of the defendant's railroad
tracks, and Droubay Road in a rural portion of Tooele County.
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The train was operated by defendant Kleinman; a deceased, Patrick
Duncan, operated the automobile and, in addition to the operator,
the autcmcbile contained three passengers. All four occupants of
the automobile were killed as a result of the collision.

I- was

dark at the time of the collision, and the weather was net a
factor.

The automobile's and the train's lights were lit.

The

train had in operation a dual headlighr, and a strobe light, both
exceeding federally mandated standards. Droubay Road crosses the
railroad tracks at an oblique angle of approximately 13 6* in the
direction
tracks.

that

the

automobile

was planning on crossing the

Considering the direction of the autcmcbile and the

train, the train was therefore approaching the crossing to the
righc from of the aurcmcbile.
observed

the

autcmcbile

The defendant engineer, Kleinman,

approaching

the

crossing

for

seme

substantial distance before the crossing, and assumed tha- the
auuomcbile wculd stop prior to reaching the crossing.
time

the

defendant

Kleinman

was

able

to

observe

Ey the
that the

automobile was not going to stop, it was ncz possible to stop the
train, or take other evasive action before the impact occurred.
The required whistle and bells on the train were operating for
the prescribed

distance

prior to the crossing.

Other than

railroad personnel on the train, there were no eyewitnesses to
the collision that survived.

Based upon the material submitted,

there is no obstruction to the observation of an approaching
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train for an automobile driver approaching, as was the Duncan
automobile in this case for some substantial distance before the
crossing (investigating officer's tests).
Plaintiffs 1
approaching

the

defendants, but

counsel

orally

crossing

was

not

argued
flat

that

as

the

terrain

suggested

by

offered no support for that conclusion.

the
The

photos, submitted to show the terrain, suggests the contrary, and
there is no genuine issue of material fact that is disputed en
that point.
consisted

The
of

approximately

a

signing on the road preceding the crossing
traditional

railroad

crossing

305 fee- in advance cf the crossing.

sign

at

Ur.rafutad

tests offered by the defendants show that the sign was visible at
nigh::, using

automobile

quarters of a mile.
itself

was

also

low

beams

for a distance

cf three-

The white crossing sign at the crossing

visible

at

that

distance.

An

automobile

traveling with high beams would be able to observe the signs in
question a mile distant from the crossing.

The automobile and

the train collided front-to-front at the crossing.

There is a

disputed issue of fact regarding the effect of marijuana use by
the deceased driver Duncan.

For the purposes of this Motion, the

Court accepts the proposition that the plaintiffs assert, to wit:
that marijuana ingestion by the plaintiff driver had no effect on
his ability to operate the vehicle in any fashion, and that his
judgment was not impaired.

At the time of the accident there
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were no flashing signals at the crossing, nor crossing arnis
prohibiting the passage of vehicle traffic onto the crossing.
RAILROAD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad was negligent in net
installing additional warning lights or other devices at the
crossing.

Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad has a duty to

install such devices concurrently with the State of Utah, and
more

particularly

the

Utah

Department

of

(hereinafter referred to as "State" or "UDCT").

Transportation
The Railroad

denies this duty, and claims that the determination of need and
the decision to install signing and ether warnings is the sole
and exclusive responsibility of the State. With that preposition
the Court agrees. Utah statutes place the responsibility clearly
upen the State for making the determination of what type of
signing and when it should be installed on railroad crossings.
This conclusion is true, even in the face of the 1975 amendment
to Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

The courts

that have interpreted Section 54-4-15, as amended, have held and
this Court finds those holdings persuasive, that no duty exists
in law for the Railroad to independently, or concurrently with
the State, install or maintain crossing signs, lights, and ether
traffic control devices at railroad crossings.

There being no

duty to sign or place signals at railroad crossings on the part
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of the Railroad!s Motion for

the remainder

Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted.
STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In considering the Statefs Motion for Summary Judgment, it
must be considered in two phases.

First, it must be determined

if the State is entitled to immunity in this case, because of the
State's

claim

that

crossing,

signing

and

signals

are

discretionary, and therefore governmental immunity is not waived
and

applies,

and

secondly,

even

if

such

activity

is

a

discretionary function, is the State still liable because of the
plaintiffs' claim that the crossing is extra hazardous.
The

process

used

by

UDOT

personnel

in

making

their

inspection of railroad crossings in this state to determine what
type cf signs and signals should be used is a process requiring
both

the

use

considerations.

of

objective

and

subjective

factors

and

It must first be determined whether or not a

particular crossing requires more than just advance signing.

If

it is so determined, then it must be determined to apply for
whatever federal funding is available.
rated

by

listing

UDOT
for

requested

personnel

crossings

throughout

and
for

the

The crossing must also be

given a position
which

state.

federal
In

on a priority

funding

reaching

has
a

been

priority

evaluation, the inspection team evaluates the potential hazards
of the crossing compared to all others in the state.

This -
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procedure is fully described in the State's Brief and supporting
documents.

The process is far beyond the perfunctory decisions

that government officials may make on a day-in and day-out basis,
which are not entitled to protection as discretionary decisions.
The

process

of

evaluation

involved here embodies the classic

elements of a discretionary function, to wit:
needs

of

weighing

differing
competing

railroad
interests

crossings

balancing various

throughout

for available

the

state,

funding, balancing

potential risk versus dollar and manpower available.

The Court

finds that the decision to add additional signs or signals to
this crossing, and when to do iz
which the State has nor waived

was a discretionary function for
immunity under Section 62-3C-

10(1) (a), Utah Coda Ann., 1952 as amended.

Having determined

thar the State is entitled to immunity under the exception of a
discretionary function, the Court declines to address the c-her
two grounds for immunity asserted by the Sta~a.
The plaintiff also claims that even if a decision to insrall
signs and signals is discretionary, the exemption dees net apply,
because the crossing is extra hazardous.
necessarily

convinced

that

the

While the Court is net

plaintiffs' proposition

is a

correct statement of the law, the Court is satisfied as a matter
of law that the

crossing

in question does not fall into the

category of extra hazardous.
reasons.

This conclusion is reached for two

First, the plaintiffs1 expert: Affidavit upon which the
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plaintiffs rely to establish their claim of an extra hazardous
crossing

is

foundation-

based

upon

inadmissible

evidence

and

a

flawed

Secondly, and more important, the evidence presented

clearly shows that this crossing does not fall into the type of
crossing

contemplated

by the Supreme Court in defining

extra

hazardous crossings.
Plaintiffs have filed the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin in
which Mr. Crommelin opines that based, at least in substantial
par::, on the inspection and surveillance reports of the State
officials at UDOT, that the crossing is extra hazardous.

That

opinion is without foundation or basis when the report relied
upon is removed from consideration, as it must be in this case.
22

U.S.C.

409

prohibits

any

court,

state

or

federal,

from

receiving into evidence reports and other information such as
UDCT surveillance reports.
action is clear.

The policy reasons behind Congress's

It is to encourage the full and free exchange

of information, and to encourage candid reports, conclusions and
evaluations by governmental officials conducting inspections at
railroad crossings and the like.

Were the reports and ether

information

teams would be chilled

making

admissible,

accurate

reports

inspection
so

as to

in

insure that they were net

hindsighted at a later time in liability actions by statements
and evaluations contained in those reports.

Plaintiffs1 expert's

conclusions are also based upon misinformation.

Mr. Crommelin

relies upon a "projected" traffic density of 1,500 vehicles per
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day, when in actuality the density was at most 530 vehicles per
day.

The statement that the placement of the advance warning

sign violated federal standards for distance is also misplaced.
The federal statute does not mandate a specific distance, it
provides a suggested distance.

In any event, the placement of

the sign could have no proximate effect upon the accident in any
event.

The driver either failed to see the sign, or ignored the

sign, and it makes little difference if an operator dees net see,
or ignores a sign 305 feet from a railroad crossing, as opposed
to not: seeing or ignoring a sign that is 750 feet from a railroad
crossing.

A careful review of the Crcmmelin claim of "similar

accidents'1 at the crossing further shows that his use of tr.abasis for determining that this crossing is ultra hazardous is in
error.

The three prior accidents upon which he relies are nco

similar to the action

in question at all.

One involved a

collision with a train where visibility was poor in a snewszorm.
The

ethers

involved

automobiles

coming

from

the

opposite

direction, which substantially changes the angle at which the
train approaches the intersection, as compared to the oncoming
approaching
These

car, and

differences

are otherwise substantially dissimilar.

were

pointed

out

in defendant

Railroad's

Memoranda, dated May 26, 1987, and the Court has received no
addition

to

conclusions

Mr.
are

Crommelin's
or

can

be

Affidavit
based

to

suggest

that his

upon proper foundations.
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Considered as a whole, the opinion of Mr. Crommelin, because of
the less of its underpinnings, cannot be considered as raising a
substantial or genuine material issue of fact on the issue of the
crossing being extra hazardous or not.
More important than the lack of plaintiff raising a genuine
issue

of

fact

on the

nature

Crommelin1s

Affidavit,

photos

other documents

and

of the crossing by way

is the

Court's

of Mr,

evaluation through the

submitted of the crossing itself.

This crossing as a matter of law dees not meet the Supreme Ccurtest as outlined in Bridces v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 433
P.2d

373

(Utah 1971).

As ncced by the Supreme Ccur- in the

Eridcres case, there must be something unusual abcu~ the crossing.
The phonos and investigating officer's tas~s and observations all
show than the surrounding land in the area of the automobile's
approach is reasonably flat.

It is flai, at leas- to the extent

that the approaching train can be readily seen and observed by
the driver of an approaching automobile.

There are no buildings

or other structures in the area to diver- a driver's attention,
or to otherwise confuse.

There are no other lights or unusual

noises to confuse or deceive an otherwise unsuspecting driver.
In sum, there is nothing about this crossing that could provide
notice to UDOT personnel that the warnings which were there at
the time of the accident were not adequate to warn the public.
While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is hard to
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imagine a crossing that presents a smaller hazard than the one in
question before the Court.

The Court therefore determines that

reasonably minds could not differ on whether or not this crossing
is extra hazardous, and concludes as a matter of law that the
crossing is not extra hazardous.
Based upon the foregoing, the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment is equally well-taken as that of the Railroad, and
should therefore be, and the same is hereby granted.
Counsel

for the Railroad

and Kleinman are requested to

prepare an appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum
Decision granting their Morion for Summary Judgment, and counsel
for the State is likewise requested to prepare an Order granting
the Scare's Mccicn for Summary Judgment in accordance wi~h this
Memorandum Decision, and submit the same to the Court for review
and signature in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Datec this

//

day of November, 1937.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Roy G. Haslam
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
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J. Clara Williams
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